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In recognition of insiders’ legitimate need to transact in their
company’s stock from time to time, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-1 in
2000. Under the rule, an insider may point to participation in a plan
whereby stock purchase prices, dates, and volumes are determined in
advance to rebut a charge of insider trading. In the years since the creation
of these 10b5-1 plans, however, it has become clear that insiders may be
exploiting loopholes in the system to engage in increased levels of insider
trading. This Article details the development of 10b5-1 plans, explains the
ambiguities leading to abuse of the plans, and recommends proposals for
change.
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INTRODUCTION
Prior to 2000, the state of the law regarding the scienter requirement
for insider trading was unsettled. With the promulgation of Rule 10b5-1,
however, the SEC clarified that knowing possession of material, nonpublic
information accompanied by a trade satisfied the scienter component of a
Rule 10b-5 violation.1 In its Adopting Release for Rule 10b5-1, the SEC
also provided for an affirmative defense whereby insiders could enter into a
transaction agreement with a broker prior to coming into possession of
material, nonpublic information.2 The 10b5-1 plan was intended to rebut
an allegation of insider trading if trades were executed within the plan and
in compliance with several factors outlined by the SEC.3 In creating the
affirmative defense, the SEC acknowledged that insiders are often in
possession of material, nonpublic information but often have a need to
transact in their companies’ securities for legitimate reasons, including
liquidity and diversification.4
Over a decade after the birth of Rule 10b5-1 and the affirmative
defense, it is increasingly apparent that 10b5-1 plans are doing little to
avert insider trading. In fact, both academic research and a number of
high-profile cases support the proposition that executives commonly are
manipulating the plans to provide cover for illegal trading activity.5 A
1. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).
2. Id. at 51,726-29.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., SEC Div. of Enforcement, Speech by
SEC Staff: Opening Remarks Before the 15th Annual NASPP Conference (Oct. 10, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch101007lct.htm#9 (“The idea was to give
executives opportunities to diversify or become more liquid through the use of plans with
prearranged trades without facing the prospect of an insider trading investigation.”).
5. See, e.g., part III, infra pp. 955-962 (discussing ways in which the plans have been

TRUPER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/3/14 10:25 AM

10B5-1 PLANS

939

watershed moment in the history of 10b5-1 plans occurred in November
2012, when the Wall Street Journal published an exposé highlighting a
number of instances in which executives fortuitously avoided significant
losses by selling company stock in advance of negative news events.6 In
each case, transactions occurred ostensibly within the bounds of a 10b5-1
plan. In response, the SEC appears to be interested in amending the Rule
and institutional investors have begun calling for changes. While the
ultimate form the plans will take is uncertain, it is clear that modification is
necessary for the plans to fulfill their intended purpose.
I.

BACKGROUND

Prior to exploring (1) the requirements of the 10b5-1 affirmative
defense, (2) the loopholes that executives are abusing, and (3) proposed
changes to the plans, it is necessary to discuss the background of Rule 10b5 and the common law development of the scienter requirement for insider
trading.
A. The Common Law Split On Insider Trading
Prior to the enactment of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(“‘34 Act”) and the promulgation of Rule 10b-5, two distinct schools of
thought regarding classical insider trading developed.7 Both viewpoints

manipulated).
6. Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Dark Markets: Executives’ Good Luck in Trading
Own Stock, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2012, at A1 [hereinafter Pulliam & Barry, Executives’
Good Luck].
7. The following discussion regarding the two distinct schools of thought is in
reference to classically conceived insider trading, where a corporate director or officer
engages in trades involving his or her own company’s stock. Classically conceived insider
trading has been described as “liability [that] occurs when a person, who stands in a
fiduciary relationship with a market participant trades shares with this participant while in
possession of material, non-public information.” Marcy G. Dworkin, The Misappropriation
Theory As A Corollary to the Classic Insider Trading Theory, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 315,
318 (1996) (internal footnotes omitted).
That description, as we will see, was up for debate under common law standards.
Classically conceived insider trading stands in contrast to the misappropriation theory of
insider trading, which commonly involves a party who is not a corporate officer or director,
but is someone who comes into possession of material nonpublic information and uses it to
his or her advantage. Under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, a fiduciary duty
does not exist between the insider and the party who trades. Misappropriation Theory of
Insider Trading, 111 HARV. L. REV. 410, 410 (1997). Rather, it focuses on the duty owed
by the insider to the source of the misappropriated information. Id. The misappropriation
theory of insider trading was first endorsed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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turned on whether a fiduciary duty extends from corporate insiders to
stockholders in their individual capacity.8 If it does, then insiders had a
duty to disclose material facts prior to engaging in trades with that
individual; if not, then no such obligation existed. Under the affirmative
view, the proposition flowed naturally from the principle that directors
were obligated to pursue profit through the corporation.9 Given the
inseparability of corporate profit and stock price, director fiduciary duties
must attach to both.10 Under the negative view, buying and selling of
corporate stock involved stockholders in their individual capacity (separate
and apart from the corporate form), and directors owed no special duties in
this regard.11
Although scholars have described the pro-finding of fiduciary duty
between corporate insiders and individual stockholders as the minority
view,12 it nonetheless appeared to have garnered the support of significant
numbers of courts.13 The Supreme Court of Georgia aptly articulated the
position in the 1903 case of Oliver v. Oliver,14 when it argued that:
[T]he fact that [a director] is trustee for all is not to be perverted
into holding that he is under no obligation to each [stockholder].
The fact that he must serve the company does not warrant him in
becoming the active and successful opponent of an individual
stockholder with reference to the latter’s undivided interest in the
very property committed to the director’s care.15
According to the court, neglecting to find a fiduciary relationship extending
8. See Clarence D. Laylin, The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock, 27
YALE L.J. 731, 739 (1918) (“The assumption seems correct that some such fiduciary relation
must be established . . . . Without it, there would be no more foundation for the duty to
disclose unsolicited information to a stockholder than there would be for such a duty on the
part of a director selling his own shares to an outsider.”).
9. Id. at 738.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 734.
12. Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical
Antecedents of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1302 (1998).
13. See e.g., Beck v. Fishel, 36 Ohio C.C. 616, 622 (Ohio Ct. App. June 7, 1909)
(“Ordinarily the officer of a corporation is bound to account to his stockholders for the
avails of any sale made by him, as any other trustee is bound to account to his beneficiary
for the avails of sales made by him”); Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277, 279-80 (Kan. 1904)
(“Since the stockholders own these shares, and since the value thereof . . . are affected by
the conduct of the directors, a trust relation plainly exists between the stockholders and the
directors . . . . From it arise the fiduciary duties of the directors towards the stockholders”);
McManus v. Durant, 168 A.D. 643, 663-64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915) (“This devolution of
unlimited power imposes on a single holder of the majority of the stock a correlative duty,
the duty of a fiduciary or agent, to the holders of the minority of the stock . . . .”).
14. 45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903).
15. Id. at 233.
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to individual stockholders that would proscribe insider trading was
downright paradoxical: It would “inevitably lead[ ] to the conclusion that,
while a director is bound to serve stockholders en masse, he may
antagonize them one by one; that he is an officer of the company, but may
be the foe of each private in the ranks.”16
In contrast with Oliver, the so-called majority view of insider trading
under common law did not think corporate insiders owed a duty to
individual stockholders to disclose material information about the company
prior to engaging in trades with them. Indeed, as one scholar described it
in a 1919 article, if an individual seller knows that the buyer, by virtue of
his position, may know more about the value than the seller, then “there is
nothing morally or legally wrong, according to present-day standards, in
laying upon [the seller] the burden of making inquiry of the buyer, and in
declaring that he assumes the risk involved in [the buyer’s] own silence.”17
One of the earliest cases to hold that corporate fiduciary duties do not
extend to situations involving insider trading is Carpenter v. Danforth.18 In
Carpenter, defendant Danforth, a director of The National Bank Note
Company, purchased 136 shares of his corporation’s stock from plaintiff
for $60 per share, or $10 per share above par.19 Danforth’s motive, both for
purchasing the stock and for paying a premium, appears to have been
gaining control of the corporation at a point when it was poised to take
advantage of lucrative government contracts.20 The work did indeed come
through as hoped, and Danforth profited handsomely by receiving the
corporation’s first-ever dividend21 of 310 percent within five months of his
stock purchase, as well as another 200 percent dividend eight months
thereafter.22
In spite of the air of bad faith surrounding the transaction, which was
further supported by the fact that Danforth purchased the stock from the
16. Id. at 235.
17. Laylin, supra note 8, at 739-40.
18. 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868).
19. Id. at 582.
20. Id. at 588. The lucrative contracts, described as “work done for the government on
the postage currency,” id., were possibly related to the ongoing monetary crisis arising from
the Civil War. The U.S. Government, facing difficulties in paying for the war, issued new
bonds, notes, and currency, financial instruments that revolutionized the U.S. monetary
system. Dancing the “Legal Tender Polka”: Public Reaction to Changes in Government
Securities during the Civil War, BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, available at http://www.moneyfactory.gov/wdclincolnexhibit3.html.
The
issuance of these new securities preceded the signing of the Legal Tender Act by President
Abraham Lincoln on February 25, 1862, and the signing of the Fractional Currency Act later
that year. Id.
21. Carpenter, 52 Barb. at 590.
22. Dawson v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of United States, 157 N.W. 929, 933 (Iowa 1916).
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executor of a family friend’s estate “under the guise of friendship,”23 the
court stated that any duties Danforth owed to plaintiff did not extend to the
stock itself.24 The court noted that although there was a trust relationship
between Danforth and the plaintiff, the relationship “extended only to the
management of the general affairs of the corporation, with a view to
dividends of profits; and . . . [it] extended no farther.”25 Therefore, the
court held, Danforth owed the plaintiff nothing more than the duty not to
engage in actual fraud.26 In the absence of fraudulent misrepresentation or
concealment of a material fact, Danforth was not liable to the plaintiff.27
Many courts continued to hew to the majority view regarding insider
trading for at least the next fifty years.28 In the 1933 case of Goodwin v.
Agassiz,29 plaintiffs sold several hundred shares of Cliff Mining Company
on the Boston Stock Exchange after reading in a newspaper that the
company was ceasing exploratory operations for copper land it owned in
Northern Michigan.30 Defendants, who served as executives of the
company, believed, based on a geologist’s theory (unbeknownst to
plaintiffs), that valuable copper deposits did exist in the area—failed
exploratory operations notwithstanding.
Defendants consequently
purchased plaintiff’s stock in a blind transaction and, after the geologist’s
theory came to light, plaintiffs sued.31 The Massachusetts Supreme Court,
in affirming the trial court’s decision, held that while the executives did
owe fiduciary duties to stockholders, they had no duty regarding disclosure
when buying and selling in an impersonal market.32
Though the majority view might seem to have produced some
unpalatable results, courts mitigated its harshness in two ways: liability
still attached to insiders who engaged in fraud, and the courts sometimes
recognized the existence of a duty to disclose if the insider was in

23. Id.
24. Carpenter, 52 Barb. at 584.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 586-87.
27. Id. at 587.
28. See, e.g., The Board of Comm’rs of Tippecanoe Co. v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 524
(1873) (railroad company president not required to disclose that the stock he was purchasing
from a stockholder was significantly undervalued where his acts were found not to relate to
the “property or to the business of the corporation”); Crowell v. Jackson, 23 A. 426, 427
(N.J. 1891) (stating that “[a] director or the treasurer of a corporation is not, because of his
office, in duty bound to disclose to an individual stockholder, before purchasing his stock,
that which he may know as to the real condition of the corporation affecting the value of
that stock.”).
29. 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
30. Id. at 659-60.
31. Id. at 660.
32. Id. at 661.
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possession of “special facts.” In the context of securities trading, common
law fraud includes: (1) “misrepresentation made for the purpose of
inducing reliance upon [a] false statement,”33 as well as (2) fraudulent
concealment of a material fact.34 Thus, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
found in Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co.35 that defendants were liable
for devising a fraudulent plan between a bank and a company president to
engage in a leveraged buy-out without disclosing material facts to the
selling shareholder.36
There was also an exception to the common law rule in the case of
“special facts.” The Supreme Court recognized the special facts doctrine in
Strong v. Repide.37 In Strong, the plaintiff’s broker had sold eight hundred
shares of the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company to a broker
acting on behalf of defendant.38 Plaintiff’s agent was unaware of
defendant’s identity (and indeed, defendant’s broker was likewise unaware,
because he had been employed by an acquaintance of the defendant and not
by the defendant directly).39 The defendant, who owned three-fourths of
the company’s stock and who served as director, also knew the value of the
shares would multiply shortly thereafter, on account of an impending sale
of the company’s land to the U.S. Government for an attractive premium.40
The Supreme Court, in finding the defendant liable, held that a director in
possession of “special facts” regarding the value of the stock was under a
duty to disclose those facts to the shareholder prior to trading the stock.41
Liability attached to the defendant, therefore, not “simply [because of] his
character as a director, but because, in consideration of all the existing
circumstances . . . it became the duty of the defendant, acting in good faith,
to state the facts before making the purchase.”42
B. Rule 10b-5 is Promulgated to Unify Securities Trading Laws
As the forgoing discussion illustrates, the state of the law regarding
liability for classical insider trading prior to the Great Depression was

33. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980); see also Carpenter v.
Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868) (defining fraud as a misrepresentation of a
material fact between a buyer and a seller).
34. Carpenter, 52 Barb. at 587.
35. 134 A.2d 761 (N.J. 1957).
36. Id. at 772.
37. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
38. Id. at 425.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 424-25.
41. Id. at 431.
42. Id.
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incongruous at best. It seems unsurprising, therefore, that a number of
“flagrant abuse[s] of inside information” were discovered in hearings
preceding the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 (“‘33 Act”) and the
’34 Act.43 In an attempt to more uniformly regulate securities markets in
general, Congress, therefore, enacted the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts.44 In passing the
‘34 Act, Congress did not attempt to enumerate an exhaustive list of acts
that would amount to securities law violations; rather, it sought to draft a
“catch-all” provision “intended to cover the full range of fraudulent
conduct that human ingenuity might devise.”45
Specifically, Section 10(b) provides that it is:
[U]nlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance . . . .”46
To implement Section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which
makes it unlawful to (a) defraud third parties, (b) make false statements of
material fact or fail to provide material information in order to correct
misleading statements, or (c) engage in any course of action that is, or
would constitute, fraud or deceit respecting the purchase or sale of any
security.47
Courts have construed insider trading to be an instance of fraudulent
conduct that falls within the broad ambit of Rule 10b-5.48 Though “insider
43. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1978).
44. Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued
Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 843, 851 (2009).
45. United States v. Lang, 766 F. Supp. 389, 400 (D. Md. 1991) (internal citation
omitted); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (noting that
Section 10(b) “was described rightly as a ‘catchall’ clause to enable the Commission ‘to
deal with new manipulative (or cunning) devices’”) (internal citation omitted). But see
Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385, 430 (1990) (explaining that the ‘34 Act as a whole was passed for the
protection of investors, while Section 10(b) specifically sought to make certain activities
illegal that had been closely associated with speculative trading).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2012).
48. Note, however, that rule 10b-5 is not the only securities law that prohibits insider
trading. Section 16(b) of the ‘34 Act requires an insider to disgorge gains from a purchase
followed by sale (or the reverse, a sale followed by purchase) within a six-month period,
inferring insider trading from the mere existence of such paired transactions. Merritt B.
Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of
Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2089-90, 2126 (1994). Additionally, Rule 14a-9 is
designed to prohibit insider abuse with regard to proxy materials, Rule 13e-3(b) regulates
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trading” is not specifically defined in federal securities laws, it is widely
understood to mean securities trading based on, or while in possession of,
material, nonpublic information.49 In re Cady, Roberts & Co. was one of
the first cases to take this position when it imposed liability on a broker
who sold a corporation’s stock on behalf of clients upon receiving advance
word that the corporation was cutting its quarterly dividend.50 The broker,
Gintel, had learned of the dividend cut after one of his fellow employees,
who also happened to be on the board of the corporation cutting the
dividend, telephoned Gintel with the news promptly upon the board’s
decision, nearly an hour before it went public.51
The rationale for imposing liability in these situations is that to allow
an insider to take advantage of material nonpublic information is to allow
fraud upon the public. In other words, insider trading is but one of the
“infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of
investors and others.”52 SEC Commissioner William Cary noted in Cady,
Roberts that the insider may avoid committing this particular variety of
fraud by disclosing the pertinent information prior to trading or, if releasing
the information first were not practicable, by abstaining from the
transaction altogether.53
Cady, Roberts did not attempt to define the term “insider.” However,
it did note that the class extended beyond just executives of the company.
After remarking that the duty not to engage in insider trading traditionally
applied to “officers, directors and controlling stockholders,” Commissioner
Cary explained that the list was not exhaustive, but that the class could best
be demarcated by looking at: (1) the existence of a relationship giving an
individual access to material, nonpublic information by virtue of his
insider trading in going-private transactions, and Regulation M-A, Item 1011(b) controls in
mergers and acquisitions. Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of
“Material” in Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 170 (2011). Section 17(a) of the ‘33
Act and 15(c)(1) of the ‘34 Act also provide avenues of policing insider trading. Freeman,
584 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1978). Finally, the Second Circuit has held that the SEC had the
authority to pursue a party for insider trading liability under Rule 14e-3 in the tender offer
context, despite the lack of a fiduciary duty as classically conceived in Chiarella. William
J. Cook, From Insider Trading to Unfair Trading: Chestman II and Rule 14e-3, 22
STETSON L. REV. 171, 174 (1992).
49. David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A Critique of the Misappropriation Theory
of Insider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 41, 41-42 (1998).
50. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 40 S.E.C. 907, 911
(Nov. 8, 1961).
51. Id. at 909.
52. Id. at 911.
53. See id. (“[F]ailure to make disclosure [when in possession of material, nonpublic
information] constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions. If, on the other hand,
disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the
circumstances, we believe the alternative is to forego the transaction.”).
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position; and (2) the “inherent unfairness” problems implicated in allowing
someone to “take[] advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”54 Gintel, though he was not
an officer or director, was nevertheless an “insider” because he had a
relationship giving him access to the information. Subsequent courts have
grappled with how far to extend liability for insider trading55 and have even
gone so far as to extend liability to tippers and tippees.56
C. Courts Imply a Private Right of Action Under Rule 10b-5
While the SEC, in promulgating Rule 10b-5, declined to specify the
remedies available upon breach,57 courts have implied a private right of
action under the Rule.58 The first court to do so was the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.59 In deliberating whether
defendants had fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to sell their stock in two
corporations, as a first-order matter the court found that the plaintiffs could
properly maintain a suit under Rule 10b-5. The court noted that “[i]t is . . .
true that there is no provision in Sec. 10 [of the ‘34 Act] or elsewhere
expressly allowing civil suits by persons injured as a result of violation of
Sec. 10 or of the Rule,” but reasoned that violating a statute either by acting
or by failing to act could amount to an actionable tort “‘if . . . (a) the intent
of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other
as an individual . . . and (b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment
is intended to protect.’”60
Since Kardon, courts have refined the elements required to sustain a
private right of action.61 A prima facie showing of a Rule 10b-5 violation
54. Id. at 912.
55. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that mere
possession of nonpublic market information does not cause a duty to disclose).
56. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (finding that a tippee has a duty
to abstain from trading on material, nonpublic information if the tipper has breached his
fiduciary duty by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should
know of that breach). This type of liability has been referred to as “outsider trading.” See
Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 198 (1991) (explaining that “[t]rading of this type is
frequently described as ‘outsider trading,’ so denominated because the traders are outsiders
with respect to the issuer of the securities they trade”).
57. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-3230, 1942 WL 34443 (May 21, 1942)
(explaining that securities fraud is a prohibited but failing to lay out any remedies).
58. See, e.g., Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940) (stating
that “[t]he power to enforce implies the power to make effective the right of recovery
afforded by the [‘33 Act]”).
59. 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
60. Id. at 513 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286).
61. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975)
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in the case of an individual requires six elements: “(1) a material
misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter (a wrongful state of mind), (3) a
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or
sale of a security, (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, (5)
economic loss, and (6) loss causation.”62
The second component of a private cause of action, scienter, was first
recognized by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder63 in 1976.
Plaintiffs, who were customers of First Securities Company of Chicago, a
securities brokerage firm, were induced to invest in a fraudulent investment
scheme carried out by the company’s president and majority shareholder.64
After the president confessed the scheme in a suicide note, the plaintiffs
sued First Securities’ long-time auditing firm, Ernst & Ernst, on the theory
that the auditors had “aided and abetted” the president’s violations of Rule
10b-5 by failing to properly audit the company.65 The plaintiffs’ theory
then amounted to a claim of negligent nonfeasance.66 In reversing the
Seventh Circuit and resolving a circuit split on the issue,67 the Supreme
Court held that a private cause of action for damages may not be
maintained without any claim of “‘scienter’ — intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.”68
The SEC, in contrast with a private plaintiff, generally needs only to
prove four elements to establish liability for a Rule 10b-5 violation: “(1) a
(affirming a Second Circuit decision limiting private rights of action to plaintiffs who are
actual purchasers or sellers of securities).
62. Stanley Veliotis, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans and Insiders’ Incentive to
Misrepresent, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 313, 316 (2010).
63. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
64. Id. at 189.
65. Id. at 189-90.
66. Id. at 190.
67. Prior to Ernst & Ernst, the courts of appeals had split on whether negligence was
sufficient for liability to attach in a securities violation case. Several courts of appeals held
that some form of negligence was sufficient. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730
(9th Cir. 1974) (discussing courts that held negligence was sufficient); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 746-48 (8th Cir. 1967) (expanding the concept of fraud to include innocent
nondislcosures); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) (holding that
intent to mislead is not required). Other courts, however, had held that something more than
negligence must be proved to find a defendant liable. See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d
1351, 1361-1362 (10th Cir. 1974) (requiring more than simple negligence); Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2nd Cir. 1973) (finding that reckless or willful or reckless
disregard for the truth is required). The Supreme Court pointed out in Ernst & Ernst that, in
a few cases, the appeals courts have held that negligence was sufficient for liability, but
have paradoxically gone on to find the defendants not liable despite their actions being
negligent. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (citing Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); Kohn v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286 (3d
Cir. 1972)).
68. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 (emphasis added).
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material misrepresentation, (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security, (3) scienter, and (4) use of the jurisdictional means.”69 This
means that the Commission does not need to show the fifth and sixth
elements of a private right of action under Rule 10b-5, economic loss and
loss causation.70 Also in contrast with private plaintiffs, the Department of
Justice (at the behest of the SEC)71 may bring a criminal enforcement
action against a party for Rule 10b-5 violations.72 A criminal enforcement
proceeding requires an additional showing of “willfulness” for liability to
attach.73
D. The Split of Authorities Surrounding the Scienter Requirement for
Insider Trading
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Ernst & Ernst purported to
resolve one circuit split, it inadvertently furthered another — one that
ultimately resulted in the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 10b5-1. The
requirement that a party have acted with the requisite state of mind seemed
clear enough; however, applying that element became much less clear in
practice. To what notion should the party’s scienter attach? Must he
knowingly possess material, nonpublic information, or must he knowingly
base his decision to trade (or to refrain from trading) on that information?74
In the first instance, an allegation of insider trading becomes much more of
a strict liability type of claim75 while the later poses a much higher burden
on the plaintiff.76
69. Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183, 1192 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted);
M. P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic Impact of
Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1608 (2007).
70. See id. at 1608 n.51 (explaining that, unlike a private cause of action, the SEC does
not need to show reliance or loss causation).
71. See Linda Chatman Thomsen, International Institute for Securities Market
Development: An Overview of Enforcement, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N 1 (2005),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_enforce/overviewenfor.pdf (explaining that
criminal enforcement actions are done through the DOJ and U.S. Attorney’s offices and that
the SEC assists in these efforts by providing access to its investigative files and assigning
staff to assist in the prosecutions).
72. Griffin Finan et al., Securities Fraud, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1129, 1132 (2011).
73. Id.
74. See Karen Schoen, Insider Trading: The “Possession Versus Use” Debate, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 239, 249-52 (1999) (discussing the differences between these two standards).
75. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1068 n.25 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]
knowing-possession standard would, we think, go a long way toward making insider trading
a strict liability crime.”).
76. See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The strongest argument
that has been articulated in support of the knowing possession test is that a strict use test
would pose serious difficulties of proof for the SEC.”).
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The SEC, for its part, has been in favor of the strict liability approach,
advocating for knowing possession to be sufficient to prove scienter, since
at least 1978.77 In a hearing before a House Subcommittee relating to the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, for example, the SEC General
Counsel at the time, Daniel Goelzer, indicated that the Commission’s
“consistent position has been that possession of material inside information
is the test,” while also noting that in adjudicative decisions, the
Commission had not always prevailed on that ground.78 In a later address,
Goelzer affirmed the Commission’s commitment to the knowing
possession test to determine liability for insider trading over the “more
stringent” use test but admitted that, in situations “where the trader has a
‘plausible argument that complicates proof’, the SEC will be ‘cautious’
about bringing the case.”79
Courts have not always agreed with the SEC, although some earlier
cases lend support for the Commission’s view. In SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.,80 the Second Circuit expounded upon the idea, first advocated
in Cady, Roberts, that an insider in possession of material, nonpublic
information must either disclose the information prior to trading or abstain
altogether (known as “disclose or abstain”).81 As the en banc court stated:
[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from
disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he
chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or
recommending the securities concerned while such inside
information remains undisclosed.82
This language seems to suggest the presence of only two options and, as a
corollary, the absence of a middle ground for possession of material,
nonpublic information and trading without basing the decision to act on the
insider information. However, the court points out that the rationale for
Rule 10b-5 is to prevent:

77. Id. at 1336 n.28. But see Schoen, supra note 74, at 254 (“Despite the assertion by
SEC Enforcement Director William R. McLucas that the Commission has always advocated
‘knowing possession’ as the appropriate rule for insider trading liability, the SEC has been
inconsistent in its interpretation of the rule.”).
78. Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearing on H.R.
559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Consumer Prot., and Fin. of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 48-49 (1983) (statement of Daniel Goelzer, SEC
General Counsel).
79. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1336 n.28 (quoting 15 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1820, 1821
(1983)).
80. 401 F.2d 833 (1968).
81. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
82. Id.
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[A]nyone who, trading for his own account in the securities of a
corporation has “access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone” . . . [from] tak[ing] “advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom
he is dealing[.]”83
By this view, the actual harm stems from the taking advantage of insider
information, rather than mere possession coincident with a trade.
In the midst of the development of the possession-versus-use debate,
Congress took action in a manner that could be interpreted as attempting to
resolve the dispute. In response to a perceived rise in the incidence of
insider trading as a result of mergers and tender offers, as well as the
growth in options markets,84 Congress amended the ‘34 Act through
enactment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (“ITSA”). The
ITSA afforded the SEC authority to pursue treble damages in a civil case
for securities fraud. In other words, the parties who were alleged to have
engaged in violations of the federal securities laws “by purchasing or
selling a security . . . while in possession of material, nonpublic
information” could be subject to a penalty of up to thrice the gains garnered
or losses avoided.85 Despite the fact that Congress used the language “in
possession” in the ITSA, the legislative history of the Act belies the claim
that Congress intended to alter the common law definition of insider
trading, which generally required the decision to engage in or abstain from
trading to be based on the material, nonpublic information.86
The Second Circuit again entered the possession-versus-use fray years
after Texas Gulf Sulphur, in its 1993 opinion, United States v. Teicher.87 In
Teicher, the Second Circuit agreed with the SEC that no connection need
be shown between the inside information and use thereof; possession is
enough.88 The Second Circuit remarked, albeit in dicta, that:
[A]s the government points out, both § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

83. Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 (Nov. 8, 1961) (emphasis added)).
84. Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearing on H.R.
559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Consumer Prot., and Fin. of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 48-49 (1983).
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-1(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
86. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 1 (1983) (stating that the purpose of the amendment is
to enable the SEC to recover in court “a civil money penalty to up to three times the amount
of profit gained or loss avoided by a person who violates, or aids and abets a violation of,
the federal securities laws by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of
material nonpublic information”) (emphasis added).
87. 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993).
88. Id.
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require only that a deceptive practice be conducted “in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.” We have
previously stated that the “in connection with” clause must be
“construed . . . flexibly to include deceptive practices ‘touching’
the sale of securities, a relationship which has been described as
‘very tenuous indeed.’”89
Given this broad construction, the court expressed incredulity as to how
anyone could adhere to the use test. It cited, as additional support, the
notion of “disclose or abstain,” stating that:
[A] “knowing possession” standard comports with the oft-quoted
maxim that one with a fiduciary or similar duty to hold material
nonpublic information in confidence must either “disclose or
abstain” with regard to trading. When the fiduciary is an insider
who is not in a position to make a public announcement, the
fiduciary must abstain.90
In SEC v. Adler, the Eleventh Circuit took an opposing view to both
the SEC and the Second Circuit, saying that a showing of use of the inside
information in making a trading decision was necessary to convict.91 In a
well-articulated opinion that details the history of the debate, the Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged that the use test did impose a higher burden of proof
on the plaintiff because it required connecting scienter and causation.
However, the court believed it could overcome this problem by imposing a
presumption of use:
It is true that it often would be difficult for the SEC to have to
prove that an insider used the inside information, i.e., that the
inside information has a causal connection to a particular trade.
However, we believe that the SEC’s problems in this regard are
sufficiently alleviated by the inference of use that arises from the
fact that an insider traded while in possession of inside
information.92
The court further noted that its approach was the one that best fit with
legislative intent and judicial precedent, both of which contradicted a strict
liability regime for knowing possession of insider information coincident
with a trade.93 Additionally, it said, both the statutory scheme and Supreme
Court precedent supported a use requirement, as evidenced by a consistent
focus on fraud and deception.94 Finally, the court noted that if its test
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 120.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. (internal footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1338.
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proved unworkable, the SEC could simply adopt a new rule “as the SEC
has done in the context of tender offers, or a rule adopting a presumption
approach in which proof that an insider traded while in possession of
material nonpublic information would shift the burden of persuasion on the
use issue to the insider.”95
Within months of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the Ninth Circuit
also took up the question of what standard would be applicable to scienter
in the context of insider trading and it too held, in United States v. Smith,
that both possession and use were necessary elements.96 In Smith, the SEC
brought a claim against Richard Smith, a vice president for a Californiabased software design firm, alleging that Smith’s bulk selloff of his
company stock within a one-week period and simultaneous short selling
amounted to violations of Rule 10b-5.97 The District Court had given the
jury an instruction regarding the requisite scienter that suggested mere
possession was sufficient to find Smith liable, stating, “[T]he government
need not prove that the defendant sold or sold short [company] stock solely
because of the material nonpublic information.”98 The Ninth Circuit, in
reversing the lower court’s decision, recognized that its standard would
increase the difficulty of the prosecution proving its case.99 Nonetheless, it
thought the burden was “by no means insuperable,” and that “[a]ny number
of types of circumstantial evidence might be relevant to the causation
issue.”100
II.

CLARIFICATION OF THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT AND BIRTH
OF THE 10B5-1 PLAN

The Eleventh Circuit’s suggestion in Adler that the SEC could
promulgate a new rule if it found the use test unworkable proved somewhat
prescient: The SEC took up the court’s proposal and was considering what
was to become of Rule 10b5-1 before the end of the following year.101 The
SEC rule was initially proposed Rule 10b5-1 on December 20, 1999102 and,
after a comment period, the final rule published on August 24, 2000, with

95. Id. at 1337 n.33.
96. 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998).
97. Id. at 1053-54.
98. Id. at 1066.
99. Id. at 1069.
100. Id.
101. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,600 (Dec.
28, 1999) (acknowledging the Adler court’s suggestion and proposing Rule 10b5-1 to
address the possession/use issue).
102. Id. at 72,611.
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an effective date of October 23, 2000.103
In the Adopting Release, the SEC specifically stated that its goal in
promulgating Rule 10b5-1 was to provide guidance on “what, if any, causal
connection must be shown between the trader’s possession of inside
information and his or her trading.”104 Not surprisingly, the Commission
adopted its prior view of the requisite connection, which was that “knowing
possession” of material, nonpublic information in conjunction with trading
was sufficient for liability.105 As the Commission stated:
[W]e believe that awareness, rather than use, most effectively
serves the fundamental goal of insider trading law — protecting
investor confidence in market integrity. The awareness standard
reflects the common sense notion that a trader who is aware of
inside information when making a trading decision inevitably
makes use of the information. Additionally, a clear awareness
standard will provide greater clarity and certainty than a
presumption or “strong inference” approach.106
Recognizing that corporate executives are often in possession of
confidential information and often trade in their own company’s stock
(given, for example, that a significant portion of executive compensation is
in the form of stock options107), however, the SEC also adopted a new
affirmative defense, the 10b5-1 plan.108 The 10b5-1 plan, according to the
Commission, was created to protect insiders who were in possession of
insider information but who nonetheless did not base their trading decision
on the material. The defense aimed to afford insiders the ability “to plan
securities transactions in advance at a time when they are not aware of
material nonpublic information, and then carry out those pre-planned
transactions at a later time, even if they later become aware of material
nonpublic information.”109
A. Requirements of a 10b5-1 Trading Plan
To effectively meet an allegation of insider trading, a 10b5-1 plan
103. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000). Rule 10b5-1 was issued on August 15, 2000. Id. at 51,740.
104. Id. at 51,727.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Richard A. Booth, Why Stock Options Are the Best Form of Executive
Compensation (and How to Make Them Even Better), 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 281, 282-83
(2010) (noting that one study found stock options for two hundred CEOs yielding more than
half their total pay).
108. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716.
109. Id. at 51,728.
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must: (1) be established in good faith at a time when the participant does
not possess material, nonpublic information; (2) pre-ordain trading price
and volume (or provide a formula to determine price and number of
securities to be traded); (3) prohibit a participant from later exerting
influence over the method or timing of transactions or whether the trade
takes place at all; and, (4) disallow a participant to change or deviate from
the plan terms except to cancel a plan, which the participant may do even if
he or she is in possession of insider information at that point.110 The plans
then can be challenged on a number of fronts, including whether the insider
entered into the plan after coming into possession of material, nonpublic
information111 or whether the insider entered into the plan in good faith and
not as part of a scheme to evade insider trading liability.112 Additionally, a
plan participant cannot get around a plan by taking a hedging position on
any transaction provided for in the plan.113
Both companies and insiders for the most part quickly embraced the
new 10b5-1 plans. The sheer number of press releases announcing the
adoption of plans by corporate executives suggests that many companies
tout adoption of a 10b5-1 plan to boost consumer confidence.114 Other
companies appear to disclose executives’ participation in the plans to ward
off litigation.115 If they do not deter plaintiffs from filing suit altogether,
110. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)-(ii) (2012); Elizabeth Noe & Rey Pascual, Stay
Current: Federal Prosecutors And Regulators Target 10B5-1 Plans - How To Mitigate
Exposure And Maximize Compliance, PAUL HASTINGS 2 (Jan. 2013),
http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/2327.pdf.
111. See Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Trading Plans Under Fire: Despite 2007
Warning, Experts Say Loopholes Remain for Corporate Insiders, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14,
2012, at C1 (noting that executives are “vulnerable” if they set up a Rule 10b5-1 plan while
already in possession of inside information).
112. See Noe & Pascual, supra note 110, at 2 (prioritizing the good faith requirement as
supreme).
113. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C) (2012).
114. See, e.g., Press Release, PRNewswire, Scripps Officers Adopt 10b5-1 Trading
Plans (Dec. 28, 2012), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/scrippsofficers-adopt-10b5-1-trading-plans-185048111.html (publicizing the idea that the Rule
10b5-1 plans allow the officers to diversify their personal holdings and fund the payment of
tax liabilities); Noe & Pascual, supra note 110, at 3 (advising clients to “[c]onsider public
disclosure of Rule 10b5-1 plans[,] [because] [a]lthough public disclosure is not required,
and there may be certain disadvantages to disclosing planned stock sales by executives, it
ensures a public record of the plan’s existence, and may also assist if civil securities class
action litigation is filed.”).
115. See, e.g., Press Release, Business Wire, Vringo Issues Statement About Recent
Director And Officer Transactions Pursuant To Rule 10B5-1 Trading Plans (Jan. 29, 2013),
available at http://www.thestreet.com/story/11825087/1/vringo-issues-statement-aboutrecent-director-and-officer-transactions-pursuant-to-rule-10b5-1-trading-plans.html (noting
that recent transactions by officers and directors pertaining to restricted stock units were
pursuant to legal Rule 10b5-1 plans and will be reported to the SEC).
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they at least put them on notice that pursuing litigation against the insiders
will not be an easy task.
III.

LOOPHOLES HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED AND EXPLOITED IN
10B5-1 PLANS

Despite the SEC’s assertion that Rule 10b5-1 and the affirmative
defense would “clarify and enhance existing prohibitions against insider
trading,”116 over time, they instead give insiders ample opportunity to not
only engage in insider trading, but also hide behind a legally sanctioned
shield. Weaknesses in the affirmative defense in particular include that
insiders do not have to disclose the existence of the plans; nor do they have
to reveal the specific provisions of their plans, and they are able to cancel
their plan at any time without disclosing the plan’s cancellation.117
Moreover, insiders can legally implement a plan immediately before the
point when they come into possession of material, nonpublic information.
There is no requirement that a plan be in place for a pre-specified amount
of time before trades begin.118 Finally, even when an insider participates in
a 10b5-1 plan, he is free to trade outside of it.119
The ability of insiders to withhold from investors the existence of
10b5-1 plans or their provisions, as well as the ability to change or
discontinue them without disclosure, provides ample opportunity for
abuse.120 This means that corporate executives can put plans in place and
then decide at the critical moment (when a definitive merger agreement is
executed and public announcement is imminent, for example) whether or
not to leave the plan in place, which will result in a trade.121 Moreover, the
ability to cancel the plan at any time can be a way to avoid losses. For
example, Former Qwest Communications International CEO Joseph
Nacchio was convicted of nineteen counts of insider trading in 2007 after
116. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000).
117. See Veliotis, supra note 62, at 326-30.
118. See Brandon C. Parris, Rule 10b5-1 Plans: Staying Out of Trouble, 17 BUS. L.
TODAY 21, 23 (2008) (noting that there are no limitations regarding the timeline/length of
Rule 10b5-1 plans, thus implying that there is no requirement for a plan to be in place for a
pre-specified period before a trade).
119. See Id. at 24 (noting the lack of formal restrictions on executives trading outside of
the Rule 10b5-1 plans).
120. See Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 111 (noting that executives need not disclose
their Rule 10b5-1 plans, one of the loopholes that possibly contributes to executives having
the ability to conduct inside trades).
121. See Justin Lahart, For Insiders, It’s All in the Timing, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2012,
at C10 (discussing that executives can implement Rule 10b5-1 plans while anticipating
certain transactions and decide, at a later time, whether to trade or not).
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selling off more than $50 million in company stock in 2001 when he knew
the company’s future prospects were deteriorating.122
The SEC
successfully contended that Nacchio had accelerated trades made under a
10b5-1 plan after learning that Qwest would miss revenue targets.123
Alternatively, if insiders come into possession of material, nonpublic
information that is better than anticipated and they are supposed to buy,
they may decrease the “buy” price or amount of shares to be purchased.
Even if insiders participate in a 10b5-1 plan, they are free to trade
outside of the plan.124 This increases the difficulty of determining whether
a given transaction took place within the boundaries of a plan, where it is
prima facie beyond a charge of insider trading, or whether it was performed
outside the plan, where it would be much more vulnerable. One could
imagine a situation in which an insider could exploit both the ability to
conceal the plan terms and the ability to trade outside the plan. The insider
could implement a plan and concurrently trade outside of it, then later
change the terms of the plan to encompass the outside trades as well. This
would essentially provide insiders with backward-looking immunity.
One of the most salient examples of the egregiousness of these
loopholes involves the CEO of Big Lots, Steve Fishman. In March 2012,
Fishman sold some $10 million of company stock, outside of his predetermined trading schedule set forth in his 10b5-1 plan.125 One month
later, Big Lots shares plummeted by twenty-four percent.126 Subsequently,
the Wall Street Journal reported that Fishman was the subject of a criminal
probe.127 After both a class action against Big Lots and a suit against
Fishman were filed, Fishman announced his retirement.128 Big Lots’
general counsel maintained that Fishman’s announcement had “nothing to

122. Carrie Johnson, Nacchio Guilty of Insider Trading, WASH. POST (April 20, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/04/19/AR2007041902738.html.
123. Peter J. Henning, The Fine Line Between Legal, and Illegal, Insider Trading, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/thefine-line-between-legal-and-illegal-insider-trading/.
124. See Parris, supra note 118, at 24.
125. Susan Pulliam & Michael Rothfeld, FBI Probes Big Lots Chief, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
8, 2012, 2:03 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324640104578163674282467766.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also infra notes 169-178 and accompanying text (outlining Big Lots’ stock
activity during Fishman’s term as CEO).
128. Press Release, PRNewswire, Big Lots Announces CEO Planned Retirement And
Transition Plan For The Coming Year (Dec. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/big-lots-announces-ceo-planned-retirement-andtransition-plan-for-the-coming-year-181998961.html.
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do with the (Wall Street Journal) article or the investigation.”129
Yet another loophole in 10b5-1 plans is the absence of rules about
how long the trading plan must be in place before trading can begin under
the plan. As the Wall Street Journal reported in November 2012,
Chairman and CEO of flooring manufacturer Mohawk Industries, Jeffrey
Lorberbaum, established a 10b5-1 plan just six days prior to engaging in
significant trades in company stock.130 After setting up his plan on March
9, 2006,131 Lorberbaum began selling stock through a family partnership on
March 15, eventually selling off approximately $10.4 million over the
course of two weeks. One day after the last stock sale, Mohawk reported a
downward revision in quarterly earnings expectations;132 the following
trading day, the company’s stock fell by nearly 5.5 percent, representing
the largest one-day decline in over two years.133 According to the Journal,
Loberbaum’s sales prior to the stock price decline allowed him to sidestep
approximately $700,000 in losses.134 Mohawk’s stock price, the Journal
reported, did not recover for the better part of a year.135
In addition to more overt abuses of 10b5-1 plans resulting from
ambiguities in SEC Rule 10b5-1, the safe harbor provided by the plans may
motivate insiders to actively misrepresent company information.136
A. Academic Literature Suggests Plans Fail to Curb Insider Trading
The forgoing discussion of loopholes in 10b5-1 plans suggests that
these plans have substantially failed to curb insider trading. However,
empirical data both confirms and, to some extent, quantifies the problems
associated with 10b5-1 plans. Todd Henderson, a law professor at the
University of Chicago who has studied abuses of these plans, indicated the
plans may even increase insider trading, saying in an interview with the
129. Tim Feran, Big Lots: Retirement Isn’t Tied to SEC Probe, COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Dec. 6, 2012, 5:44 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2012/12/06/biglots-retirement-isnt-tied-to-sec-probe.html.
130. Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6.
131. The partnership’s purported reason for entering into the plan was that plan was “a
component of its overall diversification strategy and tax planning.” Lorberbaum Group
Preparing to Sell Mohawk Shares, FLOOR DAILY (Mar. 10, 2006),
http://www.floordaily.net/flooringnews/lorberbaum_group_preparing_to_sell_mohawk_shares.aspx.
132. Press Release, SEC, Mohawk Industries, Inc. Announces Earnings Guidance
Adjustment (Mar. 30, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/851968/000085196806000035/eg3302005.htm.
133. Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Veliotis, supra note 62, at 314.
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Wall Street Journal that “‘[t]his [creation of the 10b5-1 plan affirmative
defense] was a huge gift to insiders’ . . . ‘The SEC claimed this would
reduce the probability of insider trading but it has had the opposite
effect.’”137
A 2009 study by Professor Alan Jagolinzer corroborates Henderson’s
comment. Jagolinzer analyzed 3,426 insiders at 1,241 firms138 and found
that, in general, 10b5-1 plan participants generate significant abnormal
returns when compared with insiders from the same firms who did not
participate in a plan.139 The data indicates that plan participants were able
to do so by terminating plans in advance of positive news events and by
entering into sales commitments ahead of negative news announcements.140
The majority of 10b5-1 plan transactions were sales.141
A 2012 study by Henderson, Jagolinzer, and Muller expanded
Jagolinzer’s 2009 study by exploring insiders’ rationale for disclosing
10b5-1 plan participation.142 The authors found that voluntary plan
disclosure was a litigation tactic designed to “create legal cover for
opportunistic insider trading.”143 Specifically, the data revealed that
abnormal returns to a company are significantly more negative when
following insider sales within a voluntarily disclosed 10b5-1 plan,144
suggesting the insider auspiciously avoided a loss on his sale by selling in
advance of bad news. The abnormal returns companies experienced were
generally associated with a significant decline in earnings in relation to
market expectations.145 In about twenty-five percent of cases where plan
details were specifically disclosed, the insider sold shortly before a nonearnings related decline in the company’s stock price due to events such as
announcement of a merger, a stock exchange-imposed trading halt, or a

137. Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Disclosures on Trades is Sought, WALL ST. J., Nov.
29, 2012, at C1.
138. Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 55 MGMT. SCI.
224, 227 (2009), available at
http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0928.
139. Id. at 224.
140. Id. at 235.
141. Id. at 228. Specifically, Jagolinzer found that 10b5-1 sales accounted for seventeen
times the average total dollar volume of purchases, and that a plan participant was twentynine times more likely to engage in a sale than a purchase during the observation period. Id.
142. M. Todd Henderson, Alan D. Jagolinzer, & Karl A. Muller III, Hiding in Plain
Sight: Can Disclosure Enhance Insiders’ Trade Returns? (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Gov. at
Stanford Univ. Working Paper No. 7, Aug. 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1137928.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2, 15-16.
145. Id. at 17.
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drug trial failure.146
A study by Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski, while not focused
specifically on 10b5-1 plans, also supports the argument that the
affirmative defense does little to curb insider trading.147 In analyzing
“opportunistic,” or irregular, insider traders, the authors observed that
“trades of opportunistic insiders show[ed] significant predictive power for
future news announcements about the firm, while routine trades by insiders
[did] not.”148 The results were consistent with the authors’ hypothesis that
transactions based on the insiders’ superior knowledge were less likely to
be irregularly timed, while transactions made for liquidity or diversification
reasons were more likely to be irregularly timed.149 The study was also
harmonious with Jagolinzer’s 2009 study, the authors noted, because the
data showed similar results both pre and post-adoption of the 10b5-1 plan
defense.150
B. Litigation Also Fails to Effectively Prevent Insider Trading
Historically, litigation has not been an effective method of curbing
10b5-1 plan abuses. This may come as a surprise to some: after all, recall
that a 10b5-1 defense rests on the integrity of the plan itself; it will succeed
as a defense “only when the contract, instruction, or plan to purchase or sell
securities was given or entered into in good faith and not as part of a plan
or scheme to evade the prohibitions of this [rule].”151 In theory, this
requirement should weed out those executives who establish a plan while
already in possession of inside information — those who exhibit suspicious
behavior like implementing or cancelling a plan within days of making
significant, advantageous trades. In practice, though, the good faith
prerequisite does little, if anything, to poke holes in the 10b5-1 defense.
One reason for the ineffectuality of adjudication is the fact that courts
may only consider publicly available evidence at the motion to dismiss
stage.152 Specifically, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), at

146. Id. at 17-18.
147. Lauren Cohen, Christopher Malloy & Lukasz Pomorski, Decoding Inside
Information, 67 J. FIN. 1009, 1013, 1015-16 (2012), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01740.x/pdf.
148. Id. at 1013.
149. Id. at 1041.
150. Id. at 1015-16. The authors also found that opportunistic trading was significantly
positively correlated with later SEC enforcement against the insider, and that opportunistic
traders significantly decreased trading activity after SEC enforcement actions were
highlighted in the news. Id. at 1041.
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(ii) (2012).
152. Henderson et al., supra note 142, at 4.
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this point in the pleadings a court may only utilize “the pleadings
themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings, exhibits attached to the
pleadings, and matters of public record.”153 As an evidentiary matter, a
court may also consider matters that are “generally known” or that “can be
accurately or readily determined” from trustworthy sources,154 which
includes SEC filings.155 The only indications the court would have that an
executive’s establishment of a 10b5-1 plan was not in good faith, therefore,
would be “matters of public record”156 or matters “generally known”157 that
tended to show the plan was established while the executive was in
possession of insider information. Because insider information is, by its
terms, nonpublic, one can see the conundrum plaintiffs face in successfully
challenging a 10b5-1 plan defense at the motion to dismiss stage.
Add to these constraints the heightened pleading standard for a Rule
10b-5 violation imposed under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PSLRA),158 and little is left to stop 10b5-1 plan abuses via judicial
enforcement. Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Electrical
Services Inc.,159 a 2007 case heard by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
offers a typical example of how such securities class actions proceed under
the PSLRA. In Central Laborers’ Pension Fund, the plaintiffs alleged that
defendants, executives of a publicly traded corporation, had materially
153. Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010).
154. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(1)-(2); see also Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767,
773 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a district court must limit itself to facts stated in the complaint or in
documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in the complaint by
reference.”). The pleadings encompass the complaint as well as answers. FED. R. CIV. P.
7(a)(1)-(2). Answers, in turn, lay out the affirmative defenses, listed in FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
A party would, under Rule 8(c), state the existence of a 10b5-1 plan in response to an
allegation of insider trading.
155. Kramer, 937 F.2d at 773 (rejecting an argument that SEC filings should not be
considered at the motion to dismiss stage because they were not sufficiently incorporated in
the complaint).
156. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d at 498.
157. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(1).
158. Pub. L. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.). The PSLRA imposed heightened pleading requirements for scienter in cases
alleging violations of § 10b and Rule 10b-5, in large part because of concern over frivolous
securities class action lawsuits.
Daniela Nanau, Analyzing Post-Market Boom
Jurisprudence in the Second and Ninth Circuits: Has the Pendulum Really Swung Too Far
in Favor of Plaintiffs?, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 943, 961-64 (2006). The
heightened standard calls for pleadings with particularity strong inferences of scienter, and it
was clarified by the Supreme Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. to mean
that “[a] complaint will survive . . . only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of
scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from
the facts alleged.” 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
159. 497 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund].
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misrepresented the health of the company, resulting in harm to the
plaintiffs.160 To rebut plaintiff’s allegation that defendants had the requisite
scienter161 in making misrepresentations because, among other things,
company executives had engaged in suspicious trading activity, defendant
executives raised a 10b5-1 plan defense.162
The Fifth Circuit noted in passing that the 10b5-1 plan in question did
not appear to meet the good faith requirement.163 Nonetheless, the
pleadings, taken together, failed to “permit a strong inference of
scienter.”164 Given the enhanced pleading requirement for scienter and the
fact that allegations of insider trading are often advanced as but one piece
of circumstantial evidence in favor of a finding of scienter, it is
unsurprising that 10b5-1 plans themselves lose significance in a broader
section 10(b) case.165
On the other hand, procedural constraints have not entirely deprived
litigation of its teeth in curbing 10b5-1 plan manipulations: Some
exploitations of 10b5-1 plans have been so egregious that courts cannot
overlook them. The majority of these cases are associated with a highprofile scandal. In 2010, for example, former CEO of Countrywide
Financial, Angelo Mozilo, was ordered to pay a record $67.5 million to
160. Id. at 549.
161. The “requisite scienter” in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations, which were alleged
here, is “either intent or severe recklessness.” Id. at 551 (internal quotations and citation
omitted) (emphasis in original). Severe recklessness, in turn, is:
[L]imited to those highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that
involve not merely simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care, and that present a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.
Id. (quoting Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 408 (2001)).
162. Id. at 554.
163. See id. (remarking that company CFO William Reynolds had entered into his 10b51 plan during the class period and that the defendant had failed to respond to this allegation;
therefore, “the insider trading allegations contribute[d] to an inference of scienter on the part
of Reynolds.”).
164. Id. at 555.
165. For examples of similar cases glossing over the validity of a Rule 10b5-1 plan in
the context of a broader § 10(b) case, see Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540
F.3d 1049, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting, in a larger discussion of whether defendants in a
securities fraud class action possessed the requisite level of scienter, that two defendants had
executed the majority of their trades pursuant to a 10b5-1 plan but giving that fact no weight
either way); Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 928-29 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding no inference of
the requisite level of scienter where defendants’ stock sales were made pursuant to Rule
10b5-1 trading plans but omitting to discuss whether the plans themselves were undertaken
in good faith); and In re NutriSystem, Inc. Sec. Litig., 653 F. Supp. 2d 563, 576 (E.D. Pa.
2009) (concluding that plaintiffs failed to plead facts specific to support a finding that
defendants entered into Rule 10b5-1 plans while aware of insider information).
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settle an SEC case charging Mozilo and two former Countrywide
executives with deliberately misleading investors about the deteriorating
condition of the company, described as “a looming disaster in which
Countrywide was buckling under the weight of increasing risky mortgage
underwriting, mounting defaults and delinquencies, and a deteriorating
business model.”166 Forty-five million of the settlement was attributed to
“disgorgement of ill-gotten gains” associated with Mozilo’s alleged insider
trading.167 In one of several related securities class actions, the Central
District of California District Court noted that Mozilo’s excessive
amendments to his plans “appear[ed] to defeat the very purpose of 10b5–1
plans.”168
IV.

INTEREST IN REFORMING 10B5-1 PLANS GAINS WIDESPREAD
SALIENCE

A. The Media Shines the Spotlight on 10b5-1 Plans
Although it has commonly been acknowledged within the corporate
world that executives are abusing 10b5-1 plans, the problems with such
plans gained importance among a more widespread audience in November
2012, when the Wall Street Journal published an exposé on the topic.169
The article, titled Executives’ Good Luck in Trading Own Stock, studied
thousands of SEC filings from 2004 that disclosed instances in which
corporate executives traded their own company’s stock within the five-day
period proceeding company disclosure of material information.170
What the Journal found was arguably unimpressive: Of the more than
twenty-thousand executives who traded in their own company’s stock
during the relevant time period, only about seven percent experienced gains
of more than ten percent (or avoided losses of the same amount) within the
week following disclosure of material news, while only half that number
experienced losses of ten percent or more.171 Given that insiders are
intimately familiar with both their industry and their company, it is not
166. Blake Ellis, Countrywide’s Mozilo to Pay $67.5 Million Settlement, CNNMONEY
(Oct. 15, 2010, 5:16 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/15/news/companies/mozilo_SEC/index.htm?hpt=T2.
167. Press Release, SEC, Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC’s
Largest-Ever Financial Penalty Against a Public Company’s Senior Executive (Oct. 15,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-197.htm.
168. In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1069 (C.D. Cal.
2009).
169. Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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shocking that they would record abnormal gains and avoid abnormal losses,
even if they were not in possession of material, nonpublic information at
the time of a trade.172 The cynical mind might go so far as to assume that
executives frequently engage in insider trading, thus rendering it similarly
unsurprising that executives who “dip[] in and out” of the market, as
opposed to those who “follow a consistent yearly pattern in their trading,”
tend to experience statistically better returns.173
What the Journal article did expose, however, were the problems in
determining whether executives who experienced those abnormal gains
were protected by a valid 10b5-1 plan. As the Journal quoted one hedge
fund manager as saying, “Sometimes a 10b5-1 plan is legitimate and other
times it’s not, but there is no way of knowing because there is no disclosure
of anything to investors.”174 The article highlighted six corporate
executives who sold stock, valued anywhere from $170,000 to $14 million,
in advance of company disclosure of negative, market-moving news, and
who consequently avoided significant losses.175 In five of the six cases,
company spokespeople averred that the fortuitously timed trades were
within the boundaries of 10b5-1 plans.176 The sixth instance, involving the
sale of Big Lots stock by the company’s CEO, Steve Fishman, outside of a
10b5-1 plan, is discussed in this Comment.177 Fishman’s sale of a
significant amount of Big Lots stock allowed him to avoid a $2.4 million
loss; despite that, a company representative stated that the trade in question
was appropriately made “‘at a time when the company’s trading window
was open.’”178
The ensuing public response to the Wall Street Journal article
highlighting abuses of 10b5-1 plans is an example of what scholars
describe as a classic channel of demand for business law reform.179 They
note that “[f]rom time to time, specific business issues acquire widespread

172. See, e.g., Jagolinzer, supra note 138, at 237 (cautioning that “it is important to note
that that evidence [indicating that insiders utilizing 10b5-1 plans experienced abnormal
gains and avoided abnormal losses] is not necessarily indicative of illegal behavior”).
173. Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6.
174. Id. (quoting David Berman of investment banking firm Berman Capital
Management).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fishman and
Big Lots.
178. Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6.
179. John Armour, Jack B. Jacob & Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Comparative Analysis of
Hostile Takeover Regimes in the US, UK and Japan 3-4 (Columbia Law and Econ.,
Working Paper No. 377, Aug. 12, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1657953.
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political salience, leading to a populist demand for reform.”180 This often
occurs, they say, in answer to a scandal, such as Enron and WorldCom.181
Such scandals, in turn, have commonly been uncovered or brought to
the fore by investigative journalism done by the Wall Street Journal. The
work of James B. Stewart of the Journal, regarding insider trading in the
1980s, helped shine the spotlight on the prevalence of insider trading on
Wall Street during that era.182 Because of the increased awareness of the
systemic abuse, Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, which extended the civil penalties for insider
trading to employees who fail to prevent other employees from engaging in
insider trading, and, like the ITSA, provided for treble damages.183
Likewise, it was Journal reporter Jonathan Weil who brought Enron’s
questionable accounting practices to the fore in his 2000 article, Energy
Traders Cite Gains, But Some Math Is Missing.184 A few years later, in
2006, the Journal also reported on a troubling pattern in several
companies’ stock option granting practices,185 an effort for which it
180. Id. at 4.
181. Id.
182. Stewart and fellow Journal writer Daniel Hertzberg were awarded the Pulitzer
Prize for Explanatory Journalism in 1988. Explanatory Journalism, THE PULITZER PRIZES,
http://www.pulitzer.org/bycat/Explanatory-Journalism (last visited Mar. 16, 2013). Stewart
and Hertzberg reported on Dennis Levine, an investment banker charged with setting up
connections with numerous Wall Street professionals, all of whom engaged in insider
trading. Levine Receives Prison Term, $362,000 Fine, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1987, at 2.
Stewart’s discoveries of the endemic insider trading and corruption on Wall Street at the
time are chronicled in his 1992 best-selling book, Den of Thieves.
183. Pub. L. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); see also supra, notes 84-86 and
accompanying text.
184. WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2000, at T1.
185. See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday; Some CEOs Reap
Millions by Landing Stock Options When They Are Most Valuable; Luck — Or Something
Else?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2006, at A1 (discussing Affiliated Computer Services Inc.’s
granting of stock options to CEO Jeffery Rich from 1995 to 2002, all being dated before a
rise in price and often after the price had experienced a steep decline); James Bandler &
Jennifer Levitz, U.S. Intensifies Stock Options Probe; Subpoenas by Prosecutors in
Manhattan Office Signal Major Step-Up in Security, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2006, at A3
(discussing investigation by federal prosecutors into five different companies in an effort to
discern whether effective dates on stock options were deliberately changed, or “backdated”);
Jennifer Levitz, Investigation into Stock-Options Dating Widens, WALL ST. J., May 20,
2006, at A2 (discussing three more companies that were investigated for improper stock
options dating); Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Matter of Timing: Five More Companies
Show Questionable Options Pattern — Chip Industry’s KLA-Tencor Among Firms With
Grants Before Stock-Price Jumps — A 20 Million-to-One Shot, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006,
at A1 (noting that a new statistical study indicated five more companies with questionable
and improbable stock options granting patterns); Charles Forelle, How Journal Found
Options Pattern, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, at A11 (discussing the methodology used to
identify questionable stock options granting patterns).

TRUPER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/3/14 10:25 AM

10B5-1 PLANS

965

garnered the Pulitzer Prize,186 and which contributed to the prosecution of
companies engaged in illegal backdating and increased disclosure rules
regarding in-the-money option grants to executives.187
The Journal appears to be leading the charge once again, having
exposed widespread manipulation of 10b5-1 plans. As a consequence,
interest in reforming the use of such plans has generated movement from
the SEC, action among various investor groups, and revised advice from
the legal community.
B. Various Stakeholders Suggest Fixes for 10b5-1 Plans
Recognizing that there are numerous loopholes in 10b5-1 plans,
different stakeholders are already pushing for change to ameliorate these
problems. The SEC itself recognized the potential for misuse intrinsic to
the 10b5-1 affirmative defense and consequently attempted to close some
of the loopholes as early as 2002.188 Reacting to what it described as
“advances in technology and the increased dependence on the ready
availability of current corporate information [that] have reshaped the way
our markets operate,” the SEC proposed an amendment to Form 8-K, a
filing made by companies to disclose material information an ongoing
basis.189 The amendment would have made mandatory disclosure of
“[e]ach director’s and executive officer’s adoption, modification or
termination of a contract, instruction or written plan for the purchase or sale
of company equity securities intended to satisfy the affirmative defense
conditions of Exchange Act Rule 10b5-1(c) . . . .”190
The SEC’s proposed adjustment to the 10b5-1 affirmative defense,
186. Katharine Q. Seeyle & James Barron, Wall Street Journal Wins 2 Pulitzer Prizes;
History of Civil Rights Reporting Also Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at B8.
187. See Jonathan J. Tompkins, Opportunity Knocks, but the SEC Answers: Examining
the Manipulation of Stock Options Through the Spring-Loading of Grants and Rule 10b-5,
26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 413, 417-18, 418 n.28 (2008) (noting that over one hundred
companies were scrutinized by federal prosecutors, and that the SEC promulgated Final
Rule: Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept.
8, 2006) to require thorough disclosure of in-the-money grants).
188. Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions, 67. Fed. Reg. 19,914,
19,914 (Apr. 23, 2002).
189. Id. at 19,915. For information on what must be disclosed on a Form 8-K, see Form
8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2013).
190. Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions, 67. Fed. Reg. at
19,915. Amending Form 8-K to require more timely disclosure of certain insider trades, the
SEC believed, “would enable investors to make investment and voting decisions on a more
timely and better informed basis, provide more timely information regarding management’s
view of company performance or prospects, protect investors, and promote fair dealing in
company equity securities . . . .” Id.
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however, was but one part of a broader proposal to make more timely
disclosures regarding director and officer transactions in corporate equity
securities.191 The majority of comments received in response to the
proposed rule neglected to mention the affirmative defense at all.192 Those
that did largely expressed opposition to the 10b5-1(c) aspects of the
proposal, citing concerns regarding “creating opportunities for unfair
arbitrage on an insider’s transactions,”193 and a fear of misleading or
confusing investors, especially because insiders would still be free to trade
outside of a plan.194 One of the lone voices in favor of the enhanced
disclosure with regard to 10b5-1 plans was William Miller, then-CEO of
Legg Mason Funds Management, who noted, “Under the current standard,
shareholders are in the dark about amounts, timing, etc. Since these plans
can be changed frequently without current disclosure, important
information may be obscured. Having the plans, and especially changes to
the plans, publicly disclosed is in the public interest.”195 The final rule
adopted by the SEC ultimately made no mention of 10b5-1 plans.196
191. See id. at 19,914 (“We are proposing amendments that would require some public
companies to file current reports describing: directors’ and executive officers’ transactions
in company equity securities . . . .”).
192. See Comments on Proposed Rule: Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management
Transactions, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70902.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2013) (listing the
comments, of which only a minority mention Rule 10b5-1).
193. Letter from Stanley Keller, Chair of the Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Scott
Spector, Chair of the Subcomm. on Emp. Benefits, Exec. Comp. and Section 16 & Anne G.
Plimpton, Vice Chair of the Subcomm. on Emp. Benefits, Exec. Comp. and Section 16, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 23 (July 12, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70902/skeller.htm; see also Letter from Luke Farber,
Derivatives Prods. Comm., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 6
(June 24, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70902/lfarber1.htm (“[D]isclosure of
this information is unnecessary and could be harmful to the competitive position of the
agent or counterparty. Public release of such information also raises the risk of frontrunning in advance of transactions.”).
194. See Letter from Robert Singley, Vice President and Assistant Sec’y of Wells Fargo
& Co., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (June 26, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70902/rsingley.htm (expressing concerns about
potential confusions to investors).
195. Letter from William H. Miller, III, Chief Exec. Officer of Legg Mason Funds
Mgmt., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (June 25, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70902/wmiller.txt. In 2006, Miller, whose opinion was
ultimately discarded along with the proposed changes, was called “the greatest money
manager of our time,” having beaten the market for fifteen consecutive years at that time.
Andy Serwer, The Greatest Money Manager of Our Time, FORTUNE, Nov. 27, 2006,
available at
http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/14/magazines/fortune/Bill_miller.fortune/index.htm?postvers
ion=2006111507.
196. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date;
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In 2007, the SEC again appeared to be taking a harder look at 10b5-1
plans, but once again, no changes ensued. At the fifteenth annual National
Association of Stock Plan Professionals in October 2007, then-Director of
Enforcement for the SEC Linda Thomsen noted that the Commission was
aware of the literature suggesting that the plans were being abused.197
Thomsen stated:
The date [sic] suggests that executives with plans sell more
frequently and more strategically ahead of announcements of bad
news. This raises the possibility that plans are being abused
essentially to facilitate trading on inside information. . . . If
executives are in fact trading on inside information and using a
plan for cover, the plan will provide no defense.198
Despite Thomsen’s remarks, little regulatory movement toward
increased disclosure or enforcement occurred for the next several years. It
was not until the November 2012 Wall Street Journal exposé on 10b5-1
plan misuse that interest in increased regulation was reignited. Within
weeks of the article’s publication, a consortium of pension funds called
Council of Institutional Investors (CII) submitted a letter to the SEC
Chairwoman requesting the agency heighten its regulation of the plans.199
The letter suggests, among other things, that:
• The plans only be adoptable within a pre-specified window,
• the insider be prohibited from having multiple 10b5-1 plans
with possibly overlapping provisions,
• the first trade under a 10b5-1 plan be preferably three months
after adoption of the plan, and
• the insider be prohibited from frequently modifying or
cancelling the plan.200
Additionally, the letter stated that the CII advocates pre-announced
disclosure of 10b5-1 plans and immediate disclosure of plan amendments
and plan transactions, and it recommended that the employer’s board of
Correction, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8400A, 83 SEC Docket 1427 (Aug. 4, 2004).
197. See Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enforcement,
Opening Remarks Before the 15th Annual National Association of Stock Plan Professionals
(NASPP) Conference (Oct. 10, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch101007lct.htm#9 [hereinafter Thomsen Speech]
(citing research conducted by Jagolinzer). For more information on Jagolinzer and other
scholars’ studies of how executives manipulate Rule 10b5-1 plans, see supra notes 137-150
and accompanying text.
198. Id.
199. Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel of the Council of Institutional Investors,
to the Hon. Elisse B. Walter, Chairman of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 28, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2013/petn4-658.pdf.
200. Id. at 3.
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directors adopt policies covering 10b5-1 plan practices, monitor plan
transactions, and ensure that such company policies discuss plan use in the
context of equity hedging and ownership.201
SEC Chairwoman Elisse B. Walter declined to comment on the CII
letter at the time,202 but the Commission did express its intention to improve
enforcement, if not regulation. Its own response to the Wall Street Journal
article consisted of opening a probe into trading activity by VeriFone
Systems CEO Douglas Bergeron and Big Lots CEO Steve Fishman, both of
whom were cited in the original Journal article.203 Soon thereafter, it was
reported that the SEC had widened its probe to include executives from a
broad array of companies.204
C. The Legal Community Advises Clients to Increase Transparency
In the wake of the Wall Street Journal article and increased
enforcement activity from the SEC, legal advisors have counseled clients to
err on the side of providing more transparency in plan dealings.205 In client
update blogs and newsletters, many have encouraged corporations to adopt
a form of “best practices” for plan creation and maintenance that generally
includes:
201. Id. at 1.
202. Michael Siconolfi, Pension Funds Seek Insider Curbs; In Letter to SEC Chairman,
Group Expresses Concern that Executives Benefit from Improper Trader, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
30, 2012, 8:01 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323635504578211781992442110.
203. Susan Pulliam, Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Insider-Trading Probe Widens; U.S.
Launches Criminal Investigation Into Stock Sales by Company Executives, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 10, 2012, 8:33 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323339704578171703191880378.
204. See Susan Pulliam, SEC Expands Probe on Executives Trades, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5,
2013, at C3 (stating that the SEC was expanding its investigation to companies other than
previously mentioned/investigated).
205. See, e.g., Yelena M. Barychev, Francis E. Dehel, Melissa Palat Murawsky &
Michael E. Plunkett, Current Developments in Securities Laws: 10b5-1 Plans Making
Headlines, BLANK ROME LLP 2 (Jan. 2013),
http://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/UpToDate-Dec12-Jan13-No9.pdf (suggesting that
companies publically disclose adoptions, terminations, or amendments of 10b5-1 plans);
Steve Bochner & Nicki Locker, WSGR Insight & Analysis: Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans:
Considerations in Light of Increased Scrutiny, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 2
(March 2013), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/rule-10b5-1-trading-plansconsideration-76433/ (encouraging companies to publically disclose 10b5-1 plans on Form
4 and Form 144 filings); Publications: The Spotlight Shines on Rule 10b5-1 Plans: What
Public Companies Should Consider Now, GIBSON DUNN 3 (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Spotlight-Shines-Rule10b5-1Plans-WhatPublicCompanies-ShouldConsider.aspx (suggesting companies publically disclose 10b5-1
plans in advance or at the time they are established).
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Delay: Requiring at least a modest delay between plan
adoption and commencement of trading under the plan.
• Disclosure: Providing for voluntary public disclosure of the
plan either prior to concurrently with its creation.
• Dollar Limits: Imposing transaction limits (either absolute
dollar or volume limits or proportional to the executives’
holdings) within a pre-specified time period.
Other legal advisors have gone beyond providing advice and are
taking additional measures such as hosting webinars on best practices and
risk management with regard to the plans.206
•

D. Other Suggestions for Reformation of 10b5-1 Plans
As awareness of 10b5-1 plan abuse grows, an increasing number of
voices will undoubtedly add to the discussion on reformation of the plans.
Future SEC action with regard to the plans will likely look similar to
proposals put forth by the CII and law firm advice to clients; it may also
incorporate elements of the following suggestions.
ABOLISH THE PLANS ALTOGETHER: Cohen et al. suggested that the
existence of 10b5-1 plans as an affirmative defense did nothing to
discourage opportunistic trading,207 while Henderson found that executives
may be manipulating the plans with the primary goal of decreasing
litigation, though plan participants continue to generate abnormal returns.208
The implication of the academic literature, therefore, is that perhaps the
SEC should abolish the 10b5-1 plan defense altogether. The Commission
would avoid the administrative costs associated with investigating whether
a plan was properly implemented and insiders would be deprived of a
litigation shield protecting opportunistic trades. To mitigate the harshness
of such a move, the Commission might reconsider its approach in the
possession-versus-use debate and whether the Eleventh Circuit’s approach
in Adler209 might be better suited to evaluating insider trading.
REQUIRE ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE: Rather than abolishing the 10b5-1
206. See WSGR Alert: The Latest on Insider Trading: Directors and Executives Face
Heightened Scrutiny Associated with Stock Trades Even under Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans,
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (Feb. 4, 2013),
http://www.wsgr.com/wsgr/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralertrule-10b5-1.htm#1 (scheduling a webinar focused on managing risks associated with Rule
10b5-1 plans).
207. Cohen et al., supra notes 147-150, and accompanying text.
208. Henderson et al., supra notes 142-146, and accompanying text.
209. 137 F.3d 1325, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 1998).

TRUPER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

970

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

6/3/14 10:25 AM

[Vol. 16:3

affirmative defense, the Commission instead may revisit its 2002 proposal
to require additional disclosure of plan creation, termination, and
modification on the Form 8-K. This move would be in line with both
Miller’s comments in favor of enhanced disclosure210 and the more recent
suggestions from the CII, whose members have already endorsed
heightened disclosure through commitment to corporate governance best
practices.211 The benefit of additional disclosure would need to be
considered in light of the accompanying harm of front running and
potential confusion, however.
REQUIRE DELAY BETWEEN PLAN IMPLEMENTATION AND TRADING: A
required “vesting” period after plan implementation would mitigate
opportunistic sales in advance of negative earnings announcements or the
release of other unfavorable news. Jagolinzer found in his 2009 study that
plan initiation was associated with forthcoming adverse news events; in
other words, insiders avoid losses by putting plans in place when they
know bad news is imminent.212 The data showed that the average time
between plan creation and significantly negative news events was 72.2
days.213 By widening that delay to, for example, 90 days and making the
period mandatory, the Commission could close one of the most significant
loopholes in the plan. The CII, in its letter to the SEC, specifically
requested a lag of three months or more.214
PREVENT FREQUENT PLAN MODIFICATION AND CANCELLATION: An
enforcement mechanism to preclude insiders from frequently modifying a
plan would address concerns that executives can change plans after coming
into possession of insider information. Specifically, such a rule would
prevent insiders from adjusting a plan’s “buy” volume up to take advantage
of positive news, or the “sell” volume downward to avoid losses. An
effective rule would also speak to concerns that executives cancel plans in
order to take advantage of positive forthcoming news, as Jagolinzer found
was occurring.215
The CII suggests that the SEC put a stop to these specific loopholes,
but declines to propose a prevention or enforcement method.216 Elsewhere
in its request for rulemaking letter to the SEC, however, the group does
210. Letter from William H. Miller, III, supra note 195.
211. See Letter from Jeff Mahoney, supra note 200, at 1 (showing concern of CII
members with respect to potential misuse of trading plans).
212. Jagolinzer, supra note 138, at 17.
213. Id.
214. Letter from Jeff Mahoney, supra note 199, at 3.
215. Jagolinzer, supra note 139, at 224.
216. Letter from Jeff Mahoney, supra note 199, at 3.
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recommend that the SEC only allow plan adoption during the companyspecified trading window, which typically coincides with the
announcement of quarterly earnings.217 This proposal could be expanded to
require plan modifications and cancellations to be undertaken within the
same window, thereby preventing opportunistic plan changes.
CONCLUSION
“Direct evidence of insider trading is rare,” representatives of the SEC
Division of Enforcement said in a 1998 speech.218 “There are no smoking
guns or physical evidence that can be scientifically linked to a perpetrator.
Unless the insider trader confesses his knowledge in some admissible form,
evidence is almost entirely circumstantial.”219
Unfortunately, that
circumstantial evidence is all the more obscured by the use of 10b5-1 plans.
Various groups have voiced concerns about the affirmative defense
from the beginning, but renewed focus on possible reformation of the plans
arose after the Wall Street Journal published an exposé in November 2012,
highlighting several instances of particularly suspicious trading activity
taking place under 10b5-1 plans.220 The Journal’s article appears to
corroborate both academic literature on the subject and case law. The SEC,
for its part, appears to be approaching reform from an enforcement
perspective, while other groups are pushing for regulatory change. While it
is as yet unclear whether 10b5-1 plans will survive an impending
regulatory shift, it is more apparent that some adjusting is necessary to
control insider trading that appears to be proliferating under the current
defense.

217. Id. In its letter, the CII requested the SEC to adopt guidelines or to amend Rule
10b5-1 to require plan participants to follow protocols, including that, “Companies and
company insiders should only be permitted to adopt Rule 10b5-1 trading plans when they
are permitted to buy or sell securities during company-adopted trading windows . . . .” Id.
218. Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir. of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Div. of
Enforcement & Melissa A. Robertson, Senior Counsel of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Div.
of Enforcement, Remarks Before the 16th International Symposium on Economic Crime 11
(Sept. 19, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm.
219. Id.
220. See Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6.

